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NOTES
STATUTORY COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR BOOKS AND MAGAZINES
AGAINST MACHINE COPYING
I. The Problem
Pencil and paper copying produced few pages and a copy which did not lend
itself to further multiplication. The typewriter sped the operation of pencil and
paper copying. The photostat did much more than speed up the basic copying
operation as it copied a page at a time and produced a facsimile which lent itself to
further reproduction. With the advent of the microfilm and xerox copying processes,
"Mhe amount of copying increased enormously."' Almost any markings on most
types of paper produce a facsimile which lends itself to the xerox copying process.
Many book and magazine publishers fear that the growing use of copying
machines2 is hurting sales. Libraries are receiving an increasing demand for copies.
College professors are becoming copy conscious. Industry keeps current on important
matters by supplying interested employees with copies of the latest articles. A graphic
example of industrial copying is presented by the Du Pont Co. procedure of weekly
sending a 200-page manual summarizing articles in various technical journals to
2,000 of its scientists. If a scientist desires a complete article he is supplied with a
photocopy of that article.3 It is clear that such copying practices cut sharply across
the sales of the books and magazines from which the copies are taken.
A form of copying more subtle than the direct copying of the microfilm, photo-
stat and xerox methods is the copying done to form the massive information systems
of computers. A billion dollar commercial computer business has been established
giving birth to machines the capabilities of which are beyond imagination.4 Eastern
Air Lines' use of computers to coordinate reservations and flight information presents
no problem of the pirating of another author's work. Yet computers used to give
assistance in the field of legal research, the information systems of which would
contain material copied from "[R]estatements, law journals, treatises and similar
material"5 take from the writings of others. Computers used to provide a running
index of enactments from state legislatures6 take from compilations written by
others.
Do compilers stand on the same footing as authors of books and magazines
with respect to their rights in the literary property? Does the subject matter of the
writing affect the author's rights? How does the method of copying affect the rights
of an author in his work? Does the author have statutory protection or protection
at common law?
These and other questions will be answered by defining the rights of authors
and copiers in literary material that is: (1) copied for private research; (2) copied
for commercial use. The end served by copying, whether private or commercial, is
one important variable affecting the rights in literary property. Two other important
variables are the subject matter of the material copied and the method by which
the copying is accomplished. Copyright cases are more easily understood and
1 Clapp, Library Photocopying and Copyright: Recent Developments, 55 ,LAw LIBRARY J.
10, 11 (1962). Or as another author states the matter, "(I)t must appear to those concerned
with protecting copyrights that 'do-it-yourselP home copyright infringement kits are available
to everyone." Needham, Tape Recording, Photocopying, and Fair Use, 10 COPYRIGHT LAW
SyvosiuM 75 (1959).
2 "Well over 300 million high speed copies of various published material are made each
month in the U.S., one maker of such machines estimates. That's some 50% more than were
produced monthly as recently as 1961, he figures. By 1965, the monthly rate will top 600
million, the official predicts." Wall Street Journal, June 13, 1963, p. 24, col. 2.
3 Id. col. 3.
4 Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1963, p. 92.
5 Freed, Prepare Now for Machine-Assisted Legal Research, 47 A.B.A.J. 764 (1961).
6 See, N. Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1962, p. 17, col. 6.
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reconciled if these three variables are kept in mind. The rights in literary property
may be more easily and more accurately forecast if an attorney thinks of his
client's problem in terms of the three most important variables upon which the
rights to literary property are based: (1) the end served by copying private research
or commercial use; (2) the subject matter of the copied material; (3) the manner
by which the copying is accomplished (hand copy, photocopy, computer copying).
II. Rights in Literary Material -Generally
A. History and Nature of Copyright.
Authorship, though several thousand years old, presented no need for a set of
legal rules until a few hundred years ago when the invention of the art of printing
made authorship the basis of a mass-production industry.7
The common law right of an author to the exclusive ownership of his literary
materials was acknowledged in England in 1662.8 By 1700, literary piracy in England
was becoming a national outrage which prompted Swift, Addison, Steele and
certain publishers to petition Parliament for an Act to protect their copyrights."
This resulted in the passage of an Act which granted authors protection for fourteen
years against the piracy of their published works.10
Statutory protection of copyrights in the United States is based on the English
statute of 1709.11 Before the adoption of the Federal Constitution in 1787, most
of the thirteen states passed acts which secured copyrights; but, in 1790 Congress
passed a federal copyright act, thus pre-empting the field.12 The source of Congres-
sional power for the act of 1790 and all later copyright legislation is the Constitu-
tion of the United States.'3 Congress has plenary authority in such matters.14 The
1790 act was amended and revised in the 19th century. The third revision of the
copyright laws in 1909 (which repealed and superseded prior laws on the subject)
provided for an original copyright of 28 years with a period of renewal of 28
yearsA5 and, except for minor amendments, provides the basis for copyright law
as it is today.
"Copyright in any form, whether statutory or at common law, is a monopoly;
it consists only in the power to prevent others from reproducing the copyrighted
work."'16 Copyright is the bundle of all separate rights in a literary work; it is an
intangible right intended to protect the intellectual product of the author as it is
given expression in the form of a book, article or drawing.17 Copyright is not a
protection of the intellectual conception apart from the thing produced; it is a
protection of the tangible result, the concrete form of that idea or conception.,
B. Statutory Copyright as Distinguished from Common Law Copyright.
A dual system of copyright protection exists in the United States: common
law protection and federal statutory protection. The copyright code expressly pre-
serves and leaves undisturbed the common law rights of an author or proprietor
in his unpublished work.' 9 The common law rights of an author exist in his un-
published manuscript. These rights include ownership of the physical manuscript,
the right to its first publication, the right to prevent the unauthorized publication
7 Clapp, supra note 1, at 11.
8 COPINGER AND JABES, LAW OF COPYRIGHT 7 (8th ed. 1948).
9 WiNcoR, How TO SECURE COPYRIGHT 16 (1950).
10 8 Anne c. 19, § 1 (1709).
11 Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 203 (1954).
12 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 59 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1932).
13 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8. "The Congress shall have Power .. .To promote the Progress
of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries...."
14 Woollen v. Banker, 30 Fed. Cas. 603 (No. 18,030) (C.C.S.D.Ohio 1877).
15 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1958).
16 RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712(1940).
17 King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 Fed. 533 (2d Cir. 1924).
18 White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 16 (1908).
19 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
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of the manuscript and the right to secure statutory copyright.20 Once an idea is in
manuscript form, it is automatically protected by common law.21 The author may
submit it to a publisher, read it to a friend, or do anything short of general publi-
cation,22 and the manuscript remains the exclusive property of the author. A general
publication or dissemination to the public, "[A]s implies an abandonment of the
right of copyright or its dedication to the public,"23 terminates the common law
copyright. The work has fallen into the public domain and becomes public property
if the author allows this general publication (offering copies for sale or distributing
them to the general public) without complying with the copyright act.
Compliance with the federal statute will ensure continuous copyright protec-
tion for this statutory coverage begins where common law copyright protection
ends, at the act of general publication. The common law right is a prepublication
right. Upon general publication, either the work is protected by statute if the
requirements of the statute are met or the work passes to the public where it can
never be retrieved. 24 Statutory copyright is a copyright after general publication.
Section 12 of the code2 s accords statutory protection to certain enumerated
unpublished works; with this exception, the statute does not reach unpublished
works. The proprietors of such works can look only to the common law for protec-
tion which means that state laws as to rights in literary property are applicable.26
This note deals with published material, books, and magazines that are offered
to the public for sale. Since there is a general publication of these materials, all
common law rights in the literary property are lost. If proprietors of books and
magazines are to have rights in their literary material, the act of publishing must
be done in accordance with the statute.
C. Statutory Procedure for Obtaining Copyright Protection.
Copyright may be secured for, "[A]ll the writings of an author,"27 and shall
include, but not be limited to, books, cyclopedic works, directories, compilations,
periodicals, newspapers, lectures, addresses, dramatic and musical compositions,
maps, works of art, models for works of art, reproduction of a work of art, drawings
of a technical nature, photographs, prints or labels and motion pictures. 28 Writings
include, "[A]Il forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, etc., by which the
ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression." 29
The house of copyrightability is indeed spacious: Not only will it accom-
modate "the lines of the poet . . ." and ... Joseph Conrad . . .but also
directories, circus posters, "the kind of treacle that passes in a popular love
song," "the grotesque and ludicrous Spark Plug cartoon," the "foolish" or
"silly" Wonderman or Superman comic pictures, and even deliberately crude
malapropisms .... My point is that the courts have wisely refrained from
making their own value judgments in this field.30
Little need be shown as to originality. The author may copyright that which
is distinguishable or recognizable as his own,$' or where he can show a material
revision of a previously copyrighted work. 2 The subject matter coverage of the
copyright statute is so broad that this aspect of copyright law presents little difficulty
to the publisher of books and magazines.
20 AMDUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 5 (1936).
21 Id. at 53.
22 Bobbs-Merril Co. v. Straus, 147 Fed. 15, 18 (2d Cir. 1906), aff'd, 210 U.S. 339 (1907).
23 Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321, 326 (2d Cir. 1904).
24 American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 Fed. 829 (2d Cir. 1922).
25 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
26 Cf., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
27 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
28 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1958).
29 Burrows-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 11I U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
30 Wasserstrom, Magazine, Newspaper and Syndication Problems, 1953 COPYRIGHT PROB-
LEMS ANALYZEv 159, 162 (1953).
31 Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1927).
32 Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir.
1942).
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The author or proprietor of any work or his executors, administrators, or
assigns (not licensees) may secure a copyright in any literary matter made the
subject of copyright by the code.3 4 Contrary to popular belief, the work need not
be registered in Washington before it can be copyrighted. All that need be done
to secure statutory copyright in the United States is to affix to each copy of the
work published or offered for sale in the United States the notice of copyright
required by the code.3 5
"The notice of copyright required by section 10 of this title shall consist either
of the word 'copyright,' the abbreviation 'Copr.,' or the symbol '(,' accompanied
by the name of the copyright proprietor, and if the work be a printed literary,
musical, or dramatic work, the notice shall include also the year in which the
copyright was secured by publication. 3 6 Examples of the correct form of copyright
notice would be: "Copyright 1963 by the University of Notre Dame"; "( ) 1963 by
the University of Notre Dame"; "@) 1963 by John Doe." Although not definitely
stated, magazines would seem to come under the classification of "printed literary"
works requiring the year of publication to complete the notice requirement.3 7 Strict
compliance with section 19 is essential; slight deviations may cause a proprietor to
lose all rights to his work upon publication.'
Section 20 provides for the place of application of the notice of copyright
required by section 19.
The notice of copyright shall be applied, in the case of a book or other
printed publication, upon its title page or the page immediately following,
or if a periodical either upon the title page or upon the first page of text of
each separate number or under the title heading, or if a musical work either
upon its title page or the first page of music. One notice of copyright in
each volume or in each number of a newspaper or periodical published shall
SUffice.
3 9
Here also there must be substantial compliance with the statute.40
Books and periodicals printed in the English language shall be printed from
type set within the United States or from plates made within the United States
or, if produced by a lithographic or photoengraving process, then the process must
be performed within the United States and the book shall be bound in the United
States.41
One last caveat germane to this discussion has been alluded to in footnote
33; a licensee may not obtain a copyright. Many scholars submit their articles
without any reservations of rights (the rights at this stage are common law rights)
in their work. It will be inferred that the whole interest in the literary property
has been transferred to the publisher when the author submits his manuscript and
is paid by the publisher.42 The publisher owns the literary property and, as an
33 Leigh v. Barnhart, 96 F. Supp. 194 (D. N.J. 1951).
34 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1958).
35 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1958).
36 17 u.s.c. § 19 (1958).
37 Wasserstrom, supra note 30, at 163.
38 "Registered" in place of "copyright" is fatal. Higgens v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428 (1891);
Omission of proprietor's name and/or year of copyright fatal. Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S.
123 (1889); No year is fatal. Wildman v. New York Times Co., 42 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y.
1941); But substantial compliance is allowed to avoid a harsh result. Owner's initials sufficient
where full name appears elsewhere. Glenco Refrigeration Corp. v. Raetone Commercial Refrig-
eration Corp., 149 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
39 17 U.S.C. § 20 (1958).
40 Notice on the back page is insufficient. J. A. Richards, Inc. v. New York Post, Inc., 23
F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
41 17 U.S.C. § 16 (1958).
42 Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y, Inc., 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942); Yard-
ly v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1939).
Contra, Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. 528 (1852) (dictum).
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assignee, is the proprietor 43 of the work; thus, the publisher may secure the copy-
right that, "The author or proprietor ... or his . .. assigns," 44 is entitled to under
the code. Pursuant to section 3 of the code,45 the publisher-proprietor has authority
to copyright with one general copyright notice for the complete periodical all
separate articles or contributions thereof in which the publisher holds a proprietory
or complete interest. However, if an author-contributor to a magazine merely gives
the publisher the right to publish the author's work, the publisher is constituted
a mere licensee, and not an assignee, of the author's entire rights in his work.""
In order to protect the rights of the individual contributor in a license arrangement,
the publisher must insert a separate copyright notice in the name of the individual
author in the proper place immediately preceding the author's article. In Leigh v.
Barnhart,47 plaintiff painted and copyrighted a painting; he authorized Parade
magazine to publish a single reproduction of the painting, thus constituting Parade
a licensee of a particular right in the work and not an assignee of all the author's
rights. Parade got a general copyright on the whole magazine but inadvertently
did not put the proper notice in the name of the plaintiff-author on the reproduction
of the painting itself. Defendants, as part of a union organizing campaign, published
and distributed about 750 handbills which contained a reproduction of plaintiff's
painting copied from the Parade publication. Plaintiff sued for infringement and
was denied recovery. The court so held because Parade was a mere licensee of a
right and was not the proprietor or owner of all the author's rights; thus, Parade,
as publisher was not entitled to a general copyright of the whole magazine that
would protect plaintiff's individual contribution, the painting The publisher's
general copyright would protect only those articles or contributions that Parade
wholly owned as a proprietor or assignee of the author's entire rights. Parade would
be a proprietor as to such articles because the authors had made, "[A]n assignment
of full rights." '48 A publisher must have full rights to a literary work or else the
publisher is a mere licensee and his general copyright for the entire periodical does
not cover the individual contributing article and it passes into the public domain.49
D. Remedies for Infringement.
As a condition precedent50 to bringing an action for infringement of copyright
(assuming that a copyright has been secured by general publication of the work
with proper notice of copyright), "Where shall be promptly deposited in the Copy-
right office ... two complete copies of the best edition thereof then published."51
Although the statute uses the term "promptly deposited," "[Mere delay [fourteen
43 The two terms are synonymous under the code. Quinn-Brown Publishing Corp. v.
Chilton Co., 15 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); Mifflin v. R. H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1st
Cir. 1903).
44 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1958).
45 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1958). "Protection of component parts of work copyrighted; composite
works or periodicals."
The copyright provided by this title shall protect all the copyrightable
component parts of the work copyrighted.... The copyright upon composite
works or periodicals shall give to the proprietor thereof all the rights in
respect thereto which he would have if each part were individually copy-
righted under this title.
46 New Fiction Pub. Co. v. Star Co., 220 Fed. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
47 96 F. Supp. 194 (D. N.J. 1951).
48 Id. at 195. See also, Kaplan v. Fox Film Corp., 19 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
49 For extensive coverage of this area see, Wasserstrom, The Copyrighting of Contributions
to Composite Works: Some Attendant Problems, 31 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 381 (1956); Wasser-
strom, supra note 30; Wilson, The Scholar and the Copyright Law, 10 CoPYRIuar LAw SYas-
Posrum 104 (1959); Caterini, Contributions to Periodicals, 10 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUMt
321 (1959).
50 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1958). **** No action or proceeding shall be maintained for infringe-
ment of copyright in any work until the provisions of this title with respect to the deposit of
copies and registration of such work shall have been complied with."
51 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1958). "Best edition then published," means at the time of first publi-
cation. "Complete," means that the statutory notice of copyright shall be on the copies.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
months after publication and six months after infringement] in making deposit of
copies was not enough to cause forfeiture of the right theretofore distinctly granted." s2
By including the statutory fee of $453 with the application for registration and,
"[B]y complying with the provisions of this title," 54 the Register of Copyrights issues
a certificate of registration.5 5 A suit for infringement cannot be maintained unless
a certificate has been obtained.
5 6
The remedies which the statute gives are cumulative5 7 not alternative, and as
applicable to the owners of copyrights in books and contributions to periodicals,
are: 1) injunctive relief against further infringement; 2) actual damages which
the copyright proprietor may have suffered; 3) actual profits which the infring-
er made from the infringement; 4) in lieu of actual damages, such damages as to
the court may appear to be just within the limits of $250 and $5,000; 5) the right
to have the infringing matter delivered up for destruction; 6) the right to receive
statutory damages in the discretion of the court in excess of $5,000 with no limit
specified for, "[I]nfringements occurring after the actual notice to a defendant
either by service of process in a suit or other written notice served upon him"s5 ; 7) a
criminal sanction of imprisonment up to one year or a fine not less than one hun-
dred dollars nor more than 1,000 dollars, or both, upon the conviction of, "Any
person who willfully and for profit shall infringe any copyright secured by this-
title,"59 and 8) the right of a court in its discretion to award the prevailing party
a reasonable attorney's fee.60
III. Rights in Books and Magazines- More specifically Section 1 of the code
pertains to book and magazine publishers and provides:
Exclusive rights as to copyrighted works. Any person entitled thereto,
upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive
right: (a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work;
(b) To translate the copyrighted work ... or make any other version there-
of; if it be a literary work; . . . (c) To deliver, authorize the delivery of,
read, or present the copyrighted work in public for profit if it be a lecture,
sermon, address or similar production. 61
The statute is clear and absolute. In effect the rights conferred by a copyright
constitute a monopoly, "[T]o prevent others from reproducing the copyrighted
work." 62 Although the code speaks of the "exclusive" rights of the copyright holder,
as a matter of general experience it is known that some copying of copyrighted
works is permitted. Book reviewers quote from copyrighted works in their
criticisms; authors create works which are mimicries or parodies of copyrighted
material; and newspapers often contain brief synopses of operas and plays. These
three uses of copyrighted materials seem to be infringements of the "exclusive"
rights granted to a copyright holder under section 1 of the code. Yet courts have
found no infringement where defendants have written reviews, parodies and synopses
of copyrighted works."5 Courts have said that such uses of the copyrighted work
were "fair uses," and not infringing uses. Thus courts have implied a limitation
52 Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 39 (1939). In Silvers v. Russell,
113 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Cal. 1953), a deposit thirteen years after publication did not destroy the
proprietor's rights in the copyright.
53 17 U.S.C. § 215 (1958).
54 17 U.S.C. § 11 (1958).
55 17 U.S.C. § 209 (1958).
56 Lumiere v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 275 Fed. 428 (2d Cir. 1921).
57 Sheldon v. Moredall Realty Corp., 95 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1938), aff'd, 309 U.S. 390
(1940).
58 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
59 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
60 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1958).
61 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
62 RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712
(1940).
63 AmDUR, op. cit. supra note 20, at 757-766.
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on the exclusive rights enunciated in section 1. Because of the judicial doctrine of
"fair use," which is not even mentioned in the code, copyrights are less than
absolute rights. This doctrine allows some copying of the copyrighted work as long
as the copying is reasonable and the rights of the author encompassed within the
code's protection are not materially impaired.
Fair use has no statutory basis; it is a doctrine which enables the courts
to live with a law which contains a misstatement of fact so palpable that, if
interpreted and enforced literally; it would involve them in absurdities con-
.trary to the public interest. But, since there is no way of predicting what a
court might deem absurd, it is impossible to give a satisfactory definition of
what constitutes fair use.64
The doctrine is a pragmatic one, and the question in each case of whether
there has been a "fair use" is a pragmatic question, depending on the peculiar
circumstances of each case.6 s The difficulty of drawing the line between an infring-
ing use and a "fair use' in a particular case has prompted one court to conclude
that, "[T]he issue of fair use . . . is the most troublesome in the whole law of
copyright, ... ,6
There are two primary bases for the doctrine. The primary purpose for copy-
right protection is the public good. The courts have not allowed a literal interpre-
tation of the statute to subvert this purpose. It is for the public benefit that reason-
able copying of even copyrighted works be allowed. This basic public policy purpose
also is behind the courts' denial of proprietorship rights in ideas. Ideas are the
common property of mankind and may be copied 7 An author acquires only the
right to the manner in which he expresses ideas and even this mode of expression
may be reasonably copied because of the doctrine of "fair use." 68 "Fair Use is
like an easement or a right of way through private property for the public's
benefit."69 Another basis for "fair use" is the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex.
"From numerous cases it may be concluded that in order to sustain an action for
infringement of copyright, a substantial copy of the whole, or a material part, must
be reproduced."70 In determining what is a substantial copy or a material reproduc-
tion the courts will look to such factors as the part of the author's work taken, the
part the user contributed to his own work, the value of the author's work taken, the
labor saved by using the author's work, the amount of original material added to the
author's work, whether the user's work could serve as a substitute for the author's
work and the interrelated factors of competition, commercial gain, loss to the copy-
right holder and number and quality of the copies.71
A. Copying of Books and Magazines for Private Research - The Question
of Infringement.
"Does a reader of a book infringe the copyright when he makes a handcopy
64 Clapp, Library Photocopying and Copyright: Recent Developments, 55 LAw LIBRARY J.
10, 12 (1962).
65 Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943). See, DRONE,
THE LAw OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUcTIONs 386 (1879). A plaintiff demanding ajury trial must have the issue of infringement tried before a jury before the court decides the
equitable aspects of the case. Bruckman v. 'Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1946).
66 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
67 'Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879). "The very object of publishing a book on
science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it
contains."
The forms in a booklet of forms may be copied. American Institute of Architects v.
Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Cases in this area are often decided on the
theory that the presumed intention of the author is to allow certain uses of the work. "When
the plaintiff put on the general market a book of forms, he implied the right to their private
use. This conclusion follows from the nature of a book of forms. No one reads them as liter-
ature; their sole value is in their usability."
68 Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHl. L. REv. 203, 207 (1954).
69 WiNcoR, How TO SECURE COPYRIGHT 38 (1950).
70 Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 84 (6th Cir. 1943).
71 Needham, Tape Recording, Photocopying, and Fair Use, 10 COPYRIGHT LAW Sy x-
PosIUM 75, 80-95 (1959).
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of a passage for his own purposes? According to common understanding he does
not."7 2 Although there are no decisions on this question,7" it is submitted that a
court would allow such a private copying as a "fair use" whether for a commercial
or scholarly purpose because any damage to the copyright owner is minimal and
because such copying is absolutely essential to the needs of scholars and research
workers, who advance science and the useful arts. Also, it has been the custom
from time immemorial for scholars and others to hand copy. That no one has
seriously questioned this hand copying as an infringement points to the reasonable-
ness of such a use; and, it has been said, "Fair use is technically an infringement
of copyright, but is allowed by law on the ground that the appropriation is rea-
sonable and customary."4 One writer has concluded, "Anyone may copy copy-
righted materials for purposes of private study and review."7 s The fact that there
is little or no purpose of commercial gain conributes to the conclusion that hand
copying for private scholarly use is a fair use.76 In England, any fair dealing with
a literary work for purposes of research, or private study is statutorily declared
not to be an infringement.77 The issue will probably never be judicially resolved
in the United States because of, "[T]he impossibility of controlling copying done
in private"78 and because publishers, rather than spending money on a court action,
have attempted to solve the problem through a gentlemen's agreement. 79 If the issue
should be presented for decision, hand copying for private scholarly use would be
72 KAPLAN & BROWN, COPYRIGHT 314 (1960).
73 Price, Photocopying By Libraries of Copyrighted Material, 5 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOCIETY
345, 346 (1958).
74 Loew's Incorporated v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 174
(S.D. Cal. 1955) (citing a text with approval), aff'd sub. nom., Benny v. Loew's Incorporated,
239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd without opinion by equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43(1958).
75 Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOsIUM 43, 58
(1955). See also, Price, supra note 73, at 350 "... copying for private study . . . is per-
missible."
76 Loew's Incorporated v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 176
(S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub. nom., Benny v. Loew's Incorporated, 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956),
aff'd without opinion by equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
We would conclude that the purpose for which the use was made is of
major importance, in consideration with various other factors, in arriving at
a sound determination of the extent of fair use; that broader scope will be
permitted the doctrine where the field of learning is concerned and a much
narrower scope where the taking is solely for commercial gain.
77 4 & 5 Eliz. II, c. 74, s. 6 (1). To the same effect in Canada, Copyright Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 55, s. 17 (2) (a).
78 U.S. HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., lST. SEss., REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 25 (Comm. Print
1961).
79 Smith, The Copying of Literary Property in Library Collections, 46 LAW LIBRARY J.
197, 202-204 (1953). The "Gentlemen's Agreement" was one entered into between the Joint
Committee on Materials for Research of the American Council of Learned Societies and the
Social Science Research Council, and the National Association of Book Publishers in 1935. "In
substance the agreement provides that libraries or similar institutions may make single copies
of a part of a book or periodical volume for a scholar who represents in writing that the copy
is in lieu of a loan or in place of a manual transcription and is solely for purposes of research."
But the Agreement was not and is not subscribed to by all publishers although it has been
reaffirmed by the Book Publishers' Bureau, successor to the National Association of Book Pub-
lishers. Most publishers of law books have never been members of these organizations. It has
never been ratified by the present American Book Publishers' Council, which was formed in
1946. "The agreement is not a contract. * * * Also it should be pointed out, the importance
of the agreement has been reduced by the fact that many publishers are not members of the
publishers' organization, and librarians do not know which ones are." Price, supra note 73,
at 352.
Most publishers of law books have never been members of the Book Publishers' Bureau or
of the National Association of Book Publishers but the following firms were declared to be mem-
bers of the more recent American Book Publishers' Council: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., and
Little, Brown and Company. The following law book publishers were not members: Baker,
Voorhis & Company, Bancroft-Whitney Company, Dennis & Company, Inc., Lawyers Co-
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deemed a "fair use." If the doctrine of "fair use" is to exist, it must have vitality
here as the public good would suffer enormously if researchers could not make hand
copies from copyrighted works. The second basis for the "fair use" doctrine (de
minimis non curat lex) is satisfied as there is little if any damage to the copyright
owner. Also, since actual profits or damages would be almost incapable of proof,
a court would be compelled to assess the minimum of $250 if it found a technical
infringement; and, "[T]here's been a tendency, in some cases for the courts to find
no infringement in order to avoid the minimum of $250."' 0 It is submitted that a
researcher copying by hand in good faith (though intention is not essential to render
the infringer liable for infringement) 81 represents just such a case where a court
would be very reluctant to assess the damages of 250 dollars.
It has been submitted that hand copying for private use, although a violation
of the literal words of the code, is allowable as a "fair use." Given the premise that
some "infringement" is judicially permitted, the problem becomes one "of determin-
ing the limits of this "fair use" doctrine.
The leading case which puts an upper limit on the area of "fair use" in this
area of private or semiprivate use is MacMillan Co. v. King.8 2 In this case, the
technical infringer pleading "fair use" as a defense was an economics teacher. Each
of his students was expected to possess a copy of the copyrighted textbook published
by the plaintiff. In advance of class, defendant-teacher would prepare for the
students single sheet memoranda covering the material to be dealt with in class.
All these sheets were subsequently destroyed; none were sold or leased. The under-
standing was that the sheets were to be used by the individual pupil and returned.
Some parts of the sheets did no more than refer to the book for its treatment of a
particular topic without giving a notion of what was found in the book on the
topic. "If the defendant's sheets had been constructed upon this plan throughout
... it might be said that he had done-.. . nothing which amounted to substantial
reproduction of any of the author's treatment."8 3 But the defendant went further.
In the sheets,
(T)here is frequent quotation of words, and occasional quotations of
sentences .. . the attempt is made to reproduce in abridged and para-
phrased form (so far as such reproduction is possible within the very narrow
limits adopted) the author's treatment of the topics selected, .... 4 ,
The court admitted that there was a very limited reproduction but, nevertheless,
held that such appropriation was a violation of the code. The court held that the
sheets went beyond merely putting the students on inquiry. The court was clearly
disturbed by the possibility that students might meet the requirements of the
defendant by reading the sheets without using the book. On the minor issue of
whether there was a "printing," the court said, " 'Printing' I must regard as including
typewriting or mimeographing, for the purposes of the act. .... ",s5 The court's
discussion of whether there was a "publication" by the defendant-infringer goes
to the issue of whether there may be an infringement without an offer to the public
operative Publishing Company, and Michie Company. West Publishing Company stated in a
1953 letter that it made its own arrangements for the use of copyrighted materials. Smith,
supra.
80 U.S. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., IST SEss., Discussion and Com-
ments on Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright
Law, 178, Comment by Mr. Kaminstein (1963).
81 Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1939).
82 223 Fed. 862 (D. Mass. 1914). One comment on this case: "While the fact that the
user's work cannot substitute for the author's is not enough alone to make the use fair, the point,
that the user's work cannot, is frequently stressed in cases holding that the use was fair. The
perhaps unjustifiable strength of this factor is shown by the case of Macmillan Co. v. King.
There, nearly every factor seemed to point to a finding of fair use except the substitution factor.
The case should be regarded as a questionable one." Needham, supra note 71, at 84-85.
83 MacMillan Co. v. King, 223 Fed. 862, 863 (D.C. Mass. 1914).
84 Id. at 866.
85 Id. at 867.
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by the infringer. The court found "publication" of the infringing work as there
was evidence that the agreement to return was not fulfilled in every case and that
the sheets were copied before being returned. Although the court does not say
that mere printing or copying by itself, without further publication, is enough to
constitute an infringement, it is submitted that this is the substance of the holding
because of the token publication relied on by the court.
The "further publication" issue has been resolved by later cases. Although in
the usual case an infringer circulates or publishes his copy to the public to make
a profit; it is clear that, "[M]ere printing or copying of a copyrighted work, without
proof of sales thereof, will constitute an infringement." 86 The court found only a
possibility of future damage to plaintiff's sales because of the limited number (32) of
students using the sheets. The court enjoined the defendant from such further use
of plaintiff's book, stating that, "Proof of actual damage is not necessary for the
issuance of an injunction, if infringement appears and damage may probably follow
from its continuance."'8 7 (Emphasis added.) Publishers could take a cue from such
language when bringing suit in a borderline case, to sue for injunction alone under
section 112 of the code and not force the court to choose between minimum dam-
ages of 250 dollars and no infringement at all.
In the English case of Novello v. Sudlow, 8 plaintiff was publisher and pro-
prietor of a musical periodical. Defendant was a member of the Liverpool Phil-
harmonic Society consisting of several hundred persons established for the promo-
tion of music and not as a source of profit to the members. Defendant copied from
a monthly publication of plaintiff's the musical parts of the bass, soprano, tenor
and alto for a particular work. He caused the copies to be traced and struck off
impressions solely for the members of the society about to perform the concert.
After the concert the copies remained in the custody of the society. The court said,
"[T]he act of the defendant in multiplying copies of his work, without his consent,
for extensive, though gratuitous circulation, is a violation of that right [right to
print and reprint] ... "1,9
Lest one begin to think that such old rulings would be overturned today in
view of such policy reasons as: promoting the velocity of ideas; and promoting
commercial institutions that have thrived partially because they have copied at
will from books and magazines without the delay and expense of compensating the
copyright owner, the case of Wihtol v. Crow,90 warrants examination. In that case
plaintiffs owned the copyrights covering a musical composition. Defendant was the
head of the vocal department at a high school. Without permission defendant copied
the song incorporating in it a new arrangement. 48 copies of his new arrangement
were produced by him upon one of the school's duplicating machines. The district
court found that there was a "fair use" by the defendant.9 ' The court of appeals
reversed and remanded speaking in terms that must be dear to book and magazine
publishers:
Obviously the plaintiffs had the exclusive right to copy their copy-
righted song, and obviously Nelson E. Crow had no right whatever to copy
it. The fact that his copying was done without intent to infringe would be
of no help to him,.... if the copying constituted an infringement.92
It is submitted that there is a direct analogy between a case of infringing sheet
music and a case involving the piracy from a book or magazine. The MacMillan,
86 Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Chappell & Co. v. Costa, 45
F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). Also, Macmillan Co. v. King, 223 Fed. 862 (D.C. Mass.
1914); Chappell & Co., Limited v. Columbia Graphophone Company, (1914) 2 Ch. 745;
Novello v. Sudlow, 12 C.B. 175, 138 Eng. Rep. 869 (1852).
87 Macmillan Co. v. King, 223 Fed. 862, 868 (D. Mass. 1914).
88 12 C.B. 175, 138 Eng. Rep. 869 (1852).
89 Id., 138 Eng. Rep. 869, at 875.
90 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962).
91 Wihtol v. Crow, 199 F. Supp. 682 (S.D. Ia. 1961).
92 Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1962).
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Novelloa,, and Wihtol cases seem to set an upper limit on the area of private copying
permitted by the doctrine of "fair use."
The area between hand copying for a private purpose and multiplying copies
for very limited distribution for a scholarly or gratuitous purpose gives rise to this
question: Since the scholar can hand copy for his own scholarly use, why cannot
a library make him a copy on a copying machine?
(T)he theory is advanced that libraries may make single copies of ex-
tracts, or even of whole works, as the agents of scholars without incurring
liability. Whether or not such a theory is valid is a question the courts have
not been called upon to decide in a case involving a library.93
The logic and good sense of such an argument is compelling. A researcher is allowed
to copy longhand; the same end product is created if a photocopy is produced. The
only material difference is a saving of time for the scholar. It is submitted that a
court would allow a single photocopy in lieu of a researcher's manual transcription
for the above mentioned reasons and also because of the publisher's "Gentlemen's
Agreement" and the effect of custom. The "Gentlemen's Agreement"94 between
the groups representing researchers and the National Association of Book Publishers
allows for such a use. Although all publishers have not ratified the agreement it is
a declaration of what many publishers agree to be a reasonable inclusion into the
area of "fair use," and would seem to be relevant in any court decision on the
matter. One commentator has said, "[I]t is unlikely that an American court would
find the use unfair if the central motive of the user was to advance learning.... ."95
A text writer indicates that a library assisting the reader by making a single photo-
copy of the passage at the reader's request would be acting in the "fair use" area.98
The law librarian at Columbia University acknowledges that there are no reported
cases in the area of library reproduction of single copies for the use of scholars or
for court use by lawyers because de minima non curant publishers, but goes on to
express the fear of publishers that by failing to stop this practice a sort of prescrip-
tive right will be set up.97 The publishers have reason to fear as it must be remem-
bered that in this very nebulous and undefinable area of the law known as "fair
use" what is "reasonable and customary" as a use will have a bearing on what
is a fair use.
In this area of library photocopying for scholarly use, custom is another factor
weighing against any suit the publishers might now bring. Libraries were already
sufficiently aware of the problem to organize a Joint Libraries Committee on Fair
Use in Photocopying in 1957. The findings of the Committee98 would allow photo-
copying of a single copy of any published work, apparently without distinction as
to whether the copy is to be used for scholarly ,or commercial use.
It is submitted that the Register of Copyrights' report on what a revised statute
"should say" and what the present statute "does say" would be of some weight to
a court in determining what the present statute "does say" in a situation where
the literal words of the statute allow such an interpretation and where there are
93 Smith, supra note 79, at 206. Price, supra note 73, at 353. "It has been assumed, with-
out legal authority, that a reader is free to make copies for his own use, but that is by no means
certain."
94 See, note 79.
95 Needham, supra note 71, at 89.
96 KAPLAN & BROWN, Op. cit. supra note 72, at 314.
97 Price, supra note 73, at 346.
98 Joint Libraries Report on Photocopying, 9 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOCIETY 79, 81 (1961).
The Findings of the Committee
1. The making of a single copy by a library is a direct and natural extension of traditional
library service.
2. Such service, employing modem copying methods, has become essential.
3. The present demand can be satisfied without inflicting measurable damage on pub-
lishers and copyright owners.
4. Improved copying processes will not materially affect the demand for single copy
library duplication for research purposes.
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no precedents against such a finding. The Register of Copyrights makes .a sharp
distinction between library photocopying for scholarly use, multiple copying and
copying for commercial use. The Register recommends that a library, whose collec-
tions are available to the public without charge, should be permitted to supply a
single photocopy of any reasonable part of a publication, "[W]hen the applicant
states in writing that he needs and will use such material solely for his own re-
search."9 9 Does "research" include one researching for a commercial purpose? It
is submitted that the argument allowing a single copy for scholarly use is similar to
that argument which would permit a single copy for a commercial use except that
the commercial user is usually better able to pay for the original. Query as to whether
a court would draw this distinction in a case of a hand copy or of a single photo-
copy. It is submitted that a court should allow copying no matter what the purpose
so long as the commercial user does not overstay his welcome into the area of "fair
use" by copying material of an unreasonable length. A hand copy of any length for
even commercial purposes should be allowed. The length of a hand copy would
be regulated by the cost of obtaining the material by the hand copying process.
In most cases the cost of purchasing an original work would be exceeded by all
but the shortest hand copies.
A "reasonable part" of a photocopied book or periodical copied for any purpose,
ought be limited to the length of copy a scholar would normally make if hand
copying. This limitation is necessary because while hand copying has its strict limita-
tions of physical endurance and cost to the copier, photocopying has no such inherent
limitations that would strictly limit the number or length of copies to be turned
out. Also, it must be remembered that one of the most persuasive arguments in
favor of a single photocopy for the researcher is that this photocopy is to be in lieu
of what the researcher would have hand copied.
In England and Canada such copying for private study, criticism, review or
research is provided for by statute.100 The Register of Copyrights recommends that
a photocopy of an entire publication be allowed only when a copy is not available
from the publisher. While remembering that, "Whether the courts would agree that
the present law permits photocopying under those or any other conditions is a
matter of conjecture";11 it is submitted that photocopying single copies for private
research is a "fair use."
The distinction between single and multiple copying would be a convenient
cutoff point for any court, especially if the copy was for a commercial use. But in
this area of number of copies any generalities become too dangerous because of the
case by case approach adopted by the courts. The number of copies made in the
MacMillan and Wihtol infringement cases provides the only guidelines. As soon
as more than one copy is made, the private research area is forsaken for what
begins to smack of commerciability. The publisher's argument that the photocopies
are being used as a substitute for the copyrighted work becomes controlling.
Another question in this area is the right of a book owner to keep his book whole
if the book should become tattered. One may rebind and sell the used books of the
author as: "A right of ownership in the book carries with it and includes the right to
maintain the book as nearly as possible in its original condition, so far, at least,
as the cover and binding of the book is concerned.1 10 2 But in Ginn & Co. v. Apollo
Pub. Co.,'' 3 the court found an infringement when defendant replaced missing pages
of plaintiff's book. Although defendant was a bookbinder, and in direct competition
with plaintiff, a library might also be brought under the holding of the case:
99 U.S. HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG. lST SEss., op. cit. supra note 78,
at 26.
100 See note 77.
101 Smith, The Copying of Literary Property in Library Collections, 47 LAW LIBRARY J. 204,
207 (1954).
102 Doan v. American Book Co., 105 Fed. 772, 777 (7th Cir. 1901).
103 215 Fed. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1914).
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The right given to authors and publishers should be so guarded and
protected as to give them the practical benefits the law meant them to
receive. This certainly calls upon us . . . to protect them against a repro-
duction of any part-where the reproduction of that part means to take from
them the exclusive right to make a sale which otherwise would have been
made by them.1 04
Query as to whether a library would be justified by constitutional policy to replace
pages although the replacement would take a probable sale away from the publisher.
The court in the Ginn & Co. case acknowledged that the owner had the right to
keep the book in good condition. Microfilming to save storage space might be
justified by a necessity argument but then a secondary advantage is that of preser-
vation. If one may preserve by microfilming then why not by replacement of defaced
pages? Again it must be seen that the needs and equities of a given case are de-
cisive in this borderline area. There are no cases to help define the rights in this
important area. The libraries have the advantage of the "reasonable and customary"
argument and a favorable interpretation of the present law by the Register of
Copyrights. The Register classifies as a fair use under present law the, "Reproduc-
tion by a library of a portion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy."' 05
B. Copying of Books and Magazines For Commercial Use-The Question 6f
Infringement.
Possibly the most important consideration in any "fair use" case is the question
of whether the defendant is using the pirated work for his own commercial gain.
Assuming some copying of a copyrighted work, the crucial question is whether
defendant's work is or may be used as a substitute for plaintiff's work. In case after
case in the copyright field, the court analyzes to see if there has been this unfair
competition or, more broadly, "wrongful appropriation" by the user.10 6
Unfair competition is the, "[P]ractice of endeavoring to substitute one's own
goods or products in the markets for those of another . . . by means of imitating
... the imitation being carried far enough to mislead the general public ... ,107 In
Int. News Serv. v. Associated Press,0 " the Supreme Court held that one who gathers
news at pains and expense has a quasi property right in the results of his efforts;
an injunction will issue against a rival in the same business who appropriates the
results of the efforts of the original news gatherer to his damage and for the profit
of the pirate for this is unfair competition. The broad rationale of Int. News Serv.
runs through the copyright cases whenever the issue of commercialism on substi-
tution exists.
The first and most important question to be answered concerns the internal
commercial use of copies of copyrighted material. It is well to repeat at this point
104 Id. at 779.
105 U.S. HousE Co-itM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., op. cit. supra note 78,
at 24.
106 Ginn & Co. v. Apollo Pub. Co., 215 Fed. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1914). Plaintiff sued under both
theories, the court found copyright infringement. Produce Reporter 'Co. v. Fruit Produce Rating
Agency, 1 F.2d 58 (E.D. Ill. 1924). Defendant copied plaintiff's book of information about
growers, shippers and others connected with produce handling. The court found both unfair
competition and copyright infringement.
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). In this founda-
tion case of American copyright law, the court spoke in terms similar to the court in Intel News
Serv. "If so much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of
the original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is suf-
ficient, in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto."
National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 Fed. 294 (7th Cir. 1902). In this
case of the pirating of news for tickers (facts substantially similar to those of Int'l News Serv.)
the court held the ticker tape to be noncopyrightable, but enjoined defendant from further
copying on the theory of unfair competition.
Leach & Feldman, The Relationship Between Copyright and Unfair Competition Princi-
ples, 10 COPYRIGHT LAW SymxPosiuM 266, 279 (1959). ". . . the jurisprudence indicates that
the concept of fair use is the same in copyright law and unfair competition ..
107 BLAOiC, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
108 248 U.S. 215 (1918)-
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that, "[M]ere printing or copying ... without proof of sales thereof, will constitute
an infringement."'01 9 One text writer focuses on the problem of "fair use" in this
area by posing (and leaving unanswered) this query concerning the photocopying
by a library: "But we quickly come to limiting cases: suppose a request by an
industrial concern for 30 photocopies destined for its employees engaged in profit-
connected work."" 0 It is submitted that this would be an infringement of the
copyright act as would copying done by the industrial concern itself for its own
use. The user is clearly out of the "private research" area, with its hand copying
limitations.
The cases of MacMillan, Novello and Wihtol are applicable to cases of copying
by industrial concerns for profit motives with even more force than to cases where
the use could be termed gratuitous or scholarly, because an industrial concern is
usually better able to pay for the original. Thirty-two students had used single page
sheets of "reproductions . ..within the very narrow limits adopted" by the de-
fendant teacher in the MacMillan case; in Novello an undetermined number of
copies was run off for a gratuitous circulation; in Wihtol 48 copies of the new song
arrangement were run off.
In Towle v. Ross, "1 plaintiff copyrighted a map showing electric generating
stations and transmission lines in the Northwest states. Defendants were employees
of the federal government and members of the engineering staff of the Bonneville
Administration. Photographic copies of portions of plaintiff's map were found in
the drafting room of the Bonneville Administration. The only use proved by the
plaintiff was that twelve 8" x 10" photostatic copies were made but never used.
A negative print and three other maps were also found in the possession of the
defendant. The court said:
The making of certain reproductions in part of the copyrighted map be-
longing to plaintiff is admitted. This constituted infringement whether
defendants acted in good faith and by mistake or by design. * * * There is
no fair or non-competing use of copyrighted material unless by consent."'2
(Emphasis added.)
This court concluded that the factor of competition by substitution was so crucial
that it equated "fair use" with "non-competing use." If the copy competes with
or substitutes for the original, then the copy is an infringement. It is submitted that
behind this conclusion is the determination that originals probably would have been
purchased had the copies not been made. It is submitted that this determination
is crucial. Without the probability of purchase of originals the copyright owner is
not damaged. If no damage then public policy would seem to allow the copying as
opposed to a literal reading of the statute.
The court went on to indicate that it would allow copying under the "fair
use" doctrine only when one interested in advancing the same art or science com-
mences where the prior author stopped. This use is founded upon the constitutional
policy of promoting science and ultimately the general public good. Judge Yankwich
would also equate "fair use" with "noncompeting use" as he states even more broadly,
"If ... the appropriation of the copyrighted product of another is motivated by
the desire to derive commercial benefit, the use, regardless of quantity, is unfair.""
This statement is too broad unless "commercial" connotes nonprivate use and unless
the statement includes the crucial determination that in cases of appropriation for
109 See, note 86.
110 KAPLAN & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 74, at 314.
111 32 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ore. 1940).
112 Id. at 127.
113 Yankwich, supra note 68, at 209. One writer's comment on this statement is, "In the
light of my analysis of the nature and scope of fair use, this is not the law." Needham, supra
note 71, at 93. This writer goes on to cite two cases whose dicta indicates that competition is
"unessential to infringement." Perhaps this presents a problem of mere semantics but the dicta
in both cases cited means that infringement may be found even without competition which does
not weaken the argument of those that contend that any competing use is an unfair use.
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commercial benefit the appropriator probably would have purchased originals had
it not been for the copying. As authority for his conclusion the Judge cited Henry
Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. in which an infringement was
found by defendant's use of three sentences from plaintiff's scholarly work in a
pamphlet defendant published concerning the topic of cigarette throat irritation.
The court stressed that the pamphlet was not designed to advance human knowledge
but was intended for a "purely commercial purpose," this being the sale of de-
fendant's product. Defendant could have used the scholar's idea but instead
defendant desired the words of the original work. In no way could defendant come
under the "private research" argument. The quote was to be broadcast to the
public; the aim was to advertise; the purpose and effect were solely commercial.
Of course most of the copying done today, especially in the scientific and
technical fields, both advances human knowledge and the profits of the user, thus,
most modem copying could not be deemed "purely commercial." Then the question
becomes: Should not the industrial concern pay its own way when its primary
purpose is "purely commercial"? As pointed out by one commentator in the Dis-
cussion and Comments on Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General
Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law, photocopying in disregard of copyrights is
quick and economical and "essential" as, "This is the only way we can catch up
to the Russians.""15 Yet opposing this view is the idea that, "Science, I think, exists
on the basis of published works and in most instances the margin of profit is exceed-
ingly low on these works."'1 6 The financial stability of both the user and the copy-
right owner would certainly be a factor in a case involving copying for profit. It
is submitted that in view of the literal words of the statute supported by authorities
that have been cited, and will be cited, prosperous pirate copying primarily for his
own profit from a less prosperous copyright owner will be found to have infringed
if the delay and cost in getting the information to the pirate's employees via the
book or magazine itself are not prohibitive. It is submitted that many of the present-
day pirates are "fat" enough to buy additional copies rather than photocopy from
an original. The crucial fact, buttressed by an ability to purchase, is that originals
probably would be purchased if the copies were not allowed. There would be one
original delay of perhaps as long as a week or two if an infringer stopped photo-
copying and started recognizing the rights of copyright holders. It is submitted
that a court would allow such an insignificant setback in our defense program in
order t9 give effect to the statute and the precedents. Query as to whether there
are additional delays or other obstacles that would create a more weighty argument
in favor of the photocopiers.
In Blackburn v. Southern California Gas Co., 117 plaintiff copyrighted a map.
Defendant lithographed 500 copies and also possessed 12 blueprints which were
used by defendant solely in its business. Because plaintiff waited seven years to
enforce his rights after first learning of defendant's specific infringement, the court
allowed the defendant to continue using the copies already used in the business
but assessed damages for such use.
In the English case of Ager v. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation
Company,""" plaintiff copyrighted a book of words for use in telegraphic trans-
missions of messages. Defendant made about 150 copies of this book and distributed
about 50 to its agents at home and abroad. Defendant argued "fair use," private
use and implied consent. Defendants admitted they could not sell or even distribute
gratuitously without infringing plaintiff's copyright but relied heavily on the theory
of private, limited use. The court said:
114 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
115 U.S. HousE CoMm. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., Op. cit. supra note 80,
at 31, Comment by Mr. McDonald.
116 Id. at 32, Comment by Mr. Meyerhoff.
117 14 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Cal. 1936).
118 (1884) 26 Ch. 637.
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But copyright is the right, by printing or otherwise, to multiply copies.
.. .And it has long been settled that multiplying copies for private distri-
bution among a limited class of persons is just as illegal as if it were done
for the purpose of sale. Take for example a valuable copyright like Lord
Tennyson's poems. No one can print them and distribute the copies among
his friends or among the boys at a school or any limited class of persons any
more than he can print them for sale: Novello v. Sudlow .... 'LI
The court granted an injunction; it discussed the appropriation of plantiff's time
and labor by the defendant without compensation as a method of unfair competition.
In another English case, Chappell & Co., Limited v. Columbia Graphophone
Company,2 ' plaintiffs owned the copyright in a song. Defendants caused the music
to be recorded on graphophone discs (which they had a right to do). However,
defendants recorded from an infringing copy of the song made by them for the
purpose of the otherwise legal disc recording. The court said:
It would seem to be suggested that, because there was only this one copy
made, it would not constitute an infringement, . . . To my mind the end
does not justify the means . . .and what they ought to have done was, by
a proper arrangement with the plaintiffs, to have acquired the right to take
that step, . 121
In the German case of Exchange Ass'ne. V. v. General Electricity Corp.,1 22
the corporation copied scientific magazines for the use of its employees. The court
held that such use did not come under the private use exception to infringement
liability. The German court emphasized that, although a juridical person, the
corporation copied for profit, for its own commercial end, and did not come within
the personal use exception to liability under the statute.
Louis Smith, Senior Attorney for the Copyright Office, seems to equate "fair
use" to "private use" and "noncompeting use," "the private use or fair use of the
work by others must be confined to such uses as will not compete with or undercut
the copyright owner's sale of copies to meet the public demand." 123 It is submitted
that Mr. Smith has uncovered the touchstone that most courts would consider
outcome determinative. The private use of hand copying for scholarly use is
allowed (among other reasons) because most scholars would not purchase originals.
Although better able to pay for originals, it is submitted that many hand copiers
for private, although commercial, use would also not purchase originals if copying
was not allowed. Although ability to pay increases the possibility that originals
would be purchased, also working in favor of the probability of purchase in the
commercial area is the notion that the money-making purpose might overcome
the obstacles of payment and procurement of originals more often than the purposes
behind purely scholarly research.
The Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S.
Copyright Law2 4 deals expressly with the problem of multiple and commercial
copying particularly of scientific and technical journals:
We believe that an industrial concern should be expected to buy the
number of copies it needs from the publisher, or to get the publisher's con-
sent to its making of photocopies.
Similarly, any person or organization undertaking to supply photocopies
to others, as a commercial venture would be competing directly with the
publisher, and should be expected to get the publisher's consent.
It is submitted that the literal words of the statute, the case authority and
most comments weigh heavily in favor of a finding of infringement when an indus-
119 Id. at 641.
120 (1914) 2 Ch. 745.
121 Id. at 753.
122 Needham, Tape Recording, Photocopying, and Fair Use, 10 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPO-
siuM 75, 98 (1959).
123 Smith, supra note 101, at 206.
124 U.S. HousE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., op. cit. supra note 78,
at 26. See, also Goldberg, Revision of the Copyright Law, 47 CORNELL L. Q. 549, 589-90
(1962). "The Report makes a valid distinction between photocopying performed by public
libraries . . . and industrial concerns. .. "
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trial concern 25 multiplies copies for its own internal use. If damages were demanded
for one or two infringing copies, a court might decide in favor of the user because
of. de minima non curat lex or because of a reluctance to impose the minimum
damages of 250 dollars.' 2 r To avoid this possibility, to ensure the finding of infringe-
ment even for a minimal amount of copies, the copyright owner could pray solely
for an injunction, "[I]f infringement appears and damage will probably follow
from its continuance."' 27 (Emphasis added.)
Offering or selling copies to the general public presents the clearer case of
infringement; because direct competition with the copyrighted work results in direct
damage to the copyright holder through loss of sales.
Since it is submitted that the legal noose of copyrights is tight on the neck of
the copying pirate, it is only appropriate to deal here in more detail with recog-
nized "fair uses" other than reviews, parodies and synopses of copyrighted works.
Outlines of copyrighted works for guidance to students as in the Macmillan case,
or guidance to employees as in the present Du Pont procedure of sending to its
scientists a 200-page manual containing summaries of articles in various technical
journals may be a "fair use" if, "It gives just enough information to put the reader
upon inquiry .... ,,2' But, as illustrated by Macmillan, the area of "fair use" in
outline writing is very limited and is exceeded when there is the possibility that
readers may "substitute" the outline for the copyrighted work.
In the area of the copying of texts, scientific and technical writings, case reports
and compilations of statutes, there is little case authority. A sharp distinction must
be made between the copier who uses his piracy to put out a competing work
and the professional man (lawyer, doctor, teacher, engineer, architect) who copies
as an aid to his work, and the student who copies in order to use the ideas of
others as a starting point for the development of his own.
The copier who intends to put out a competing work may make, "[Jse of
the original as a means of reference to the original sources, from which the book
is subsequently written, . . .,"9 The key to "fair use" here is that the copier may
use all the references in the copyrighted work but must make an original investiga-
tion of the source material.13
0
It has been opined that the student may make a single photocopy of hand
copy length, especially so in the field of scientific and technical writing.'2 '
125 Let it be remembered that although libraries most often operate their photocopying
departments at cost or at a loss, the summary of one study showed that a majority of the orders
filled at libraries were requests for copies of works in the scientific and technical fields with a
heavy majority of all copying done on the request of corporate and other institutional users.
At the New York Public Library nearly 75% of the orders were received from large corpora-
tions. Joint Libraries Report on Photocopying, supra note 98. It is clear that both the library
and the requesting institution are as much infringers as if the requester was doing his own copy-
ing. See, Price, Photocopying by Libraries of Copyrighted Material, 5 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOCI-
ETY 345, 352-355 (1958), for possible safeguards against library liability.
126 However, in Towle v. Ross, 32 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ore. 1940), the court allowed $250
damages where the only proof of damages was that twelve 8" x 10" photostatic copies made but
never used, one negative print used to make the copies and three other maps found in the pos-
session of defendant.
127 MacMillan Co. v. King, 223 Fed. 862, 868 (D. Mass. 1914). But, in Towle v. Ross, 32
F. Supp. 125 (D. Oregon 1940), plaintiff prayed for both damages and an injunction. He re-
ceived damages but the court held that no injunction was necessary as there was no attempt
to put the map to use after plaintiff's original claim of infringement.
128 G. Ricordi & Co. v. Mason, 201 Fed. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). Defendant's outlines
of plaintiff's operas were "fair uses." The court emphasized that a reader of the outline re-
ceived only a vague, fragmentary and superficial idea of the plot which would have a beneficial
effect upon the market of the owner of the copyright.
129 West Publishing 'Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 Fed. 833, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1909).
130 Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 144 Fed. 83 (7th Cir. 1906), aff'd, 209 U.S. 20
(1908).
131 Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 Fed. 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1905).
"So, also it is clear that, under some circumstances and for certain purposes, a subsequent pub-
lisher may draw from the earlier publication its identical words, and make use of them. This
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In between the copier, who intends to put out a competing work, and the
student, who presents no threat of competition, is the lawyer, doctor, teacher,
engineer or architect who, except for the teacher, copy primarily for their own
commercial gain. This is the gray area with few cases to act as guidelines. What
of the case of an attorney copying materially from a legal text and submitting
copies to 15 other attorneys in the firm? General experience teaches that most law
firms can afford only one copy of a legal text, one set of the various case reports,
and one set of statutes. It is submitted that most law firms, even if not allowed to
copy, would not purchase additional texts merely to acquaint the office on one small
area of the law but instead would pass the single copy around the office. If this
is the case, then there is no injury to the author if copying is allowed because there
is no competition (substitution). A finding of infringement would serve only to slow
down the internal workings of the law office. The doctrine of "fair use" is available
to the courts to avoid such an absurd result. The MacMillan case is some authority
for finding infringement; however, the possibility of substituting the copy for the
original was much stronger in that case than in the example presented. Photo-
copying of less expensive works such as magazines presents a much weaker case
in favor of "fair use" as there is a greater possibility that originals would be pur-
chased if copies were not available.
The copier of statutes and case reports has few worries. In New York, this
copier enjoys constitutional protection in that "[A]II laws and judicial opinions or
decisions shall . . . be free for publication by any person."' 32 In Davidson v. Whee-
lock,"" the court declared that, although a compiler of state statutes may copyright
his combination and analysis he cannot obtain a copyright for the publication of
the laws alone, nor can a state legislature confer such privilege upon him. In Banks
v. Manchester,34 the Supreme Court held that the State of Ohio could not authorize
the reporter of the Ohio Supreme Court reports to copyright that court's decisions.
The court stressed that only Congress could authorize a copyright and went on
to say:
The question is one of public policy, and there has always been a
judicial consensus, . . . that no copyright could under the statutes passed
by Congress, be secured in the products of the labor done by judicial officers
in the discharge of their judicial duties. The . . .work done by the judges
... is free for publication to all....
It seems clear that the bare statute or court opinion may be copied at will
whether from an official or unofficial reporter. Publishers may only copyright such
part of a published decision that represents their own labor and skill such as head-
notes and statements about the case. 3 5 It would seem that the only value of such
a copyright would be to prevent a competitor from copying without independent
investigation. Any incidental copying of headnotes and other original material of
the publisher that might accompany a court opinion, for example, copied for com-
mercial use (i.e., passed out to the members of a law firm) would be allowed under
the theory of de minimis, supported by an argument that the purpose and intent
of the publishing was to allow copying by practitioners because of the nature of
the material.
Computer copying, although a copying for commercial use, presents a unique
copying problem.
is peculiarly so with reference to works in regards to the arts and sciences, using these words in
the broadest sense, because, with reference to them, any publication is given out as a develop-
ment in the way of progress, and, to a certain extent, by common consent, including the im-
plied consent of the first publisher, others interested in advancing the same art or science may
commence where the prior author stopped. This includes medical and legal publications, in
which the entire community has an interest, and which the authors are supposed to give forth,
not only for their own pecuniary profit, but for the advancement of science."
132 N.Y. GONST. art. VI, § 22 (1954).
133 27 Fed. 61 (C.G.D. Minn. 1866).
134 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888).
135 Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888).
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Is the feeding of information from copyrighted material into the memory of
a computer a fair use?
Is this analogous to microfilming to save storage space? Since the com-
puter would not merely passively record the information, e.g., the contents
of an almanac or encyclopedia, but would integrate it with other informa-
tion in a manner similar to the operations of the human mind, should ordi-
nary rules apply?' 38
This introduction presents the two large questions in the computer area. What
plausible analogies would a court accept in a computer infringement case? Because
of the unique nature of computers, are any analogies acceptable? Publishers have
pondered over the question of whether the absorbing of copyrighted material into
the information systems of computers is an infringement. Publishers have pondered
while computer industry leaders have built a billion dollar industry. The computer
industry has an estoppel argument that grows stronger with time and the growth
of the industry. A court might find an infringement if the existing giant that is
the computer industry could recognize the rights of copyright owners without
unduly burdening computer operations. A court that decided in favor of non-
infringement would have its strongest authority in White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo
Co." 7 In that case defendant engaged in the sale of player pianos and perforated
music rolls. Plaintiff owned the copyright in sheet music copied onto rolls by the
defendant and sought to enjoin such activity. The Supreme Court affirmed the
court of appeals' affirmation of the dismissal of the complaints. Plaintiff argued
that the copyright act protected the intellectual conception which resulted in the
compilation of notes; defendant argued that the statute only extended to the
tangible results of the mental conception. The court distinguished playing an
instrument from sheet music which appears to the eye and playing, "[A]n instru-
ment with a perforated sheet which itself forms part of the mechanism which
produces the music. .. ."I'S The court, in interpreting the copyright statute, con-
cluded that Congress meant to deal with the concrete reproduction or duplication
of a thing, not an abstract right of property in ideas. The court defined a "copy"
as, "[A] written or printed record . . . in intelligible notation."'1 9 The court con-
tinued, "It may be true that in a broad sense a mechanical instrument which
reproduces a tune copies it; but this is a strained and artificial meaning."'140 The
court concluded that the piano rolls were not "copies!' within the act, and the
reproduction of music on piano rolls was not a copying of the copyrighted sheet
music.
In the year following White-Smith Music Co., Congress revised the copyright
statute giving composers of copyrighted musical compositions and authors of copy-
righted dramatic works' 4' the exclusive right of recording their works. One com-
mentator has indicated that the use of copyrighted material in computers, "[I]s
obviously a recording of protectable information which I should think a clear
violation of I(d) unless it be fair."' 42 This commentator seems to accept White-
Smith Music Co. as shutting the door on the idea that copyrights protect the
"intellectual conception," but, he would include the material copied into computer
136 Needham, supra note 122, at 102.
137 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
138 Id. at 14.
139 Id. at 17.
140 Id. at 17. For indications of the continued vitality of this case see U.S. HousE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SEss., General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, 22
(1961) and U.S. HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SEss., Discussion and
Comments on Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copy-
right Law, 345, Comment by Mr. Sargoy (1963).
141 17 U.S.C. § I (d),(e) (1958).
142 U.S. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., lST SESS., op. Cit. supra note 140,
at 32, Comment by Mr. McDonald.
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information systems under the protection of section l(d) of the code.143 Such a
contention is contrary to the holding of Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 4 1
In that case plaintiff copyrighted a poem; defendant set the poem to music and
sold the records to the public. Plaintiff relied on the "intellectual conception"
argument; but the court, after indicating that, "If the question were one of first
impression we might be inclined to agree,' '145 concluded that plaintiff's argument
was foreclosed by the decision in White-Smith Music Co. Speaking of the 1908
statute and the 1909 changes the court said:
We see no material difference between the working of the statute there
under consideration and the phraseology of the pertinent part of the present
act. In the 1909 revision Congress undertook to remedy certain deficiencies
discovered in the former statute; but it is significant that in the respects we
are now considering the provisions added relate only to musical composi-
tions, 17 U.S.C.A. § 1(e), and dramatic works, 17 U.S.C.A. § 1(d). These
changes were made in the light of the decision in the White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. case, and they serve rather to emphasize the limited scope of
subsection (a) as applied to the type of work now before us.146
The court also rejected plaintiff's argument under section 1(b) that plaintiff had
the right to make "any other version" of the poem by deciding that White-Smith
Music Co. foreclosed such an argument and if (b) was construed so broadly (d)
would be rendered superfluous. The court construed subsections (d) and (e) to
refer to dramatic works and musical compilations only, "Congress did not see fit
to give like protection to copyrighted poems, stories or works of that nature."1 47
In light of this decision it cannot be seriously contended that the copying of non-
dramatic work into computer information systems is a violation of section 1(d).
The Corcoran decision also precludes the possibility of finding a 1(b) violation;
White-Smith Music Co. precludes the finding of a 1(a) violation. Publishers can
still present the "intellectual conception" argument relying on King Features Syndi-
cate v. Fleischer,14s in which the court found infringement when defendant made
and sold a toy based upon plaintiff's copyrighted comic strip figures. "The protec-
tion accorded the owner of the copyright is of the intellectual product of the author.
It is intended to protect any species of publication which the author selects to
embody his literary product."
Reliance also could be placed on Hill v. Whalen & Martell,149 in which
defendant, using characters "Nutt and Giff" in a dramatic performance, infringed
plaintiff's copyrighted cartoon characters, "Mutt and Jeff." Other cases with
"intellectual conception" connotations strengthen the publishers' case.'50
143 This section gives the author of a drama or a dramatic work the right to make, "any
transcription or record thereof ......
144 121 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941).
145 Id. at 573.
146 Id. at 573. Also 17 U.S.C. § 1 (a) (1958).
147 Id. at 574.
148 299 Fed. 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1924).
149 220 Fed. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
150 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1934),
aff'd, 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 717 (1935). Defendant's doll infringed
plaintiff's copyrighted cartoon.
Falk v. T. P. Howell & Co., 37 Fed. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1888). Defendant's stamping raised
figure on leather of chair bottoms and backs infringed plaintiff's copyrighted photograph.
These cases also present undertones of unfair competition and the "wrongful appropria-
tion" spoken of in Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See note 106 for
the interrelation of the copyright and unfair competition areas.
See also, Blackburn v. Southern California Gas Co., 14 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Cal. 1936),
where the court gave damages but denied an injunction because plaintiff in suing on a copy-
right theory showed a lack of vigilance in bringing his action. Publishers in any action against
computer copying could well be denied an injunction for the same reason. Damages under an
unfair competition theory would seem to be minimal because limited to the cost of the book or
magazine from which the information was taken.
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Yet the copy in each of these cases is a reproduction, "[W]hich appears to the
eye."'' It is not a reproduction in the manner of a, "[P]erforated sheet which
itself forms part of the mechanism," which the Supreme Court has held to be,
"[Qjuite another thing." 52 Also, in Corcoran, the record is just part of the mech-
anism which reproduces the poem; the record is not a copy within the meaning
of the act.
Congress, as a result of White-Smith Music Co., only amended the code with
respect to musical compositions and dramatic works. It is submitted that the restricted
interpretation of the word "copy" found in White-Smith Music Co. applies to such
other areas as tapes or reels containing scientific and technical data, and compila-
tions of statistics taken from copyrighted material. It applies to the tapes and reels
forming part of a machine that integrates all the information in its memory to
produce an answer.
It is submitted that the computer people armed with White-Smith Music Co.,
Corcoran and the estoppel argument present such a solid case in favor of non-
infringement that only Congress, by amendment in widening the provisions of
section 1(d) and 1(e) to cover the type of copyrighted material usually assimi-
lated into computer information systems, could afford protection. Copyright pro-
tection for such appropriation is not available under the present statute.-.
IV. What Practical Benefits Result From a Finding of Infringement?
Is a discussion of what constitutes an infringement merely academic because
the remedies afforded by the act are inadequate? Certainly a publisher would be
reluctant to bring an action against the usual book or magazine infringer because
of the expense of litigation, the difficulty of proof and the inadequacy of the
remedy. Probably only about 25 or 30 copyright actions are litigated each year.5 3
In a typical case of a corporate infringer, copying for internal use, the infringe-
ment would have to be noticed; then proof of copying would necessitate a witness
familiar with the internal workings of the company. After going through the
trouble of bringing suit and finding a case of infringement the most that could
be hoped for would be a decree enjoining such copying. Even after such a decree,'
effective policing of it would be difficult. Even if the decree were obeyed, only one
small source of lost sales would be stopped; publishers cannot afford such a piece-
meal approach. Judging from the publishers' inaction it would seem such anti-
infringement litigation is worthless.
In most cases, actual damages are not provable. In assessing just damages, in
lieu of actual damages, a judge may speculate in his estimation, within the statu-
tory limits (250 dollars-5,000 dollars), without the limitations of usual legal proof; 54
or, he may use the schedule in section 101 (b) of the code which provides for
damages of one dollar for each infringing copy of a book or magazine made, the
aggregate amount to be within the 250 dollar to 5,000 dollar limitation. 55 It has
151 White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 12 (1908).
152 Id. at 14.
153 Karp, Copyright Litigation, 7 COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS ANALYZED 143 (1952).
154 Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 Fed. 412, 413 (2d Cir. 1916). The court approved
this language of the district court Judge Learned Hand. "'I must assess the damages, all things
considered, by the best inference I can make, even when I cannot have much basis for certainty,
even when the plaintiff would fail, were the issue tried before a jury.'"
A discussion of the problem of the awarding of one statutory award or multiple awards
in cases of multiple infringements see U.S. House COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., Op. cit. supra note 140, at 25, 104-105.
155 This seems to be a popular remedy when it is compensatory. Unistrut Corporation v.
Power, 175 F. Supp. 294 (D. Mass. 1958), modified, 280 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1960); Harry Alter
Co. v. A. E. Borden Co., 121 F. Supp. 941 (D. Mass. 1954).
Where one infringes after notice the sum of the one dollar per copy damages may exceed
$5,000. Schellberg v. Empringham, 36 F.2d 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
The one dollar per copy schedule is not followed when the court considers lesser damages
to be just. 8 cents per copy. Turner & Dahnken v. Crowley, 252 Fed. 749 (9th Cir. 1918);
2 cents per copy. Zenn v. Nat'l Golf Review, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
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been held that where there is no proof of actual damages, the minimum award
of 250 dollars is mandatory; 56 although in one case in which no damage was
suffered, a nominal one dollar was awarded.''
The maximum award of 5,000 dollars has been awarded in only a few in-
stances.' Awards may be over 5,000 dollars only when actual damages are
proved,'59 or when there is an intentional infringement after notice.
To defer the costs of bringing suit the court may, in its discretion, award to
the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees. 3,500 dollars was allowed to counsel
for a successful plaintiff in an action where plaintiff's attorneys had charged 8,692
dollars. 6 ' For more typical cases such as Blackburn with damages of 750 dollars
and a partial injunction, 750 dollars in fees were allowed; in Macmillan, there was
no mention of fees; in Towle, no fees were awarded.
Running through the cases is the theme that the total amount of money
awarded is to be compensatory,' 6 ' not punitive.' 62 For the book and magazine
publisher whose copyrighted works are being infringed on a national basis, the
decree and/or damages allowed in a single suit are hardly adequate to remedy the
nationwide infringement problem.
To achieve the goal of stopping substantially all the infringing photocopying
in the United States, as a practical matter the case by case approach is worthless.
Suggested instead is a two-barrelled approach of: 1) an intensive publicity cam-
paign to make the government, business corporations and other institutional in-
fringers aware of the copyright law in order to promote the institutional conscience
to do its own policing; 2) a campaign to convict important infringers-for-profit
under section 104 of the code with punishment up to one year and/or a fine of
between one hundred dollars and 1,000 dollars.
Each aspect of this approach is complementary. The initiation and favorable
disposition of infringement suits, both civil and criminal, would quickly depict
publishers' advertisements, containing examples of infringing photocopying pro-
cedures, as harbingers of a campaign to enforce publishers' rights. A present obstacle
to any such approach is that the criminal sanction for willful infringement for profit
is only a misdemeanor and although:
[The FBI has made extensive investigations here or there . . . the local
U.S. attorney turns down prosecution because it's a misdemeanor and, in his
mind, it's no more important than expectorating on the sidewalk or smoking
in a prohibited area.' 6 '
Recent findings of copyright infringement would provide excellent examples of
the dangers attendant on copyright infringement and could be of immense value
to copyright owners if properly exploited through planned advertising in the very
publications being infringed.
There is evidence that a mere filing of suits would make institutions copyright-
conscious. Mr. Edward Sargoy, counsel for the Copyright Committee of the Motion
Picture Association of America, Inc., tells' 4 of the educational campaign launched
156 Buck v. Bilkie, 63 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1933).
157 Rudolf Lesch Fine Arts, Inc. v. Metal, 51 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
158 Caplan, The Measure of Recovery in Actions For the Infringement of Copyright, 37
MICH. L. Rxv. 564, 585 (1939).
159 In Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 556 (D. Mass. 1928) the court
found $23,500 of actual damages with uncustomary ease.
160 Stein v. Rosenthal, 103 F. Supp. 227 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 633 (9th Cir.
1952). Also $1,000 awarded to plaintiff in Harry Alter Co. v. A. E. Borden Co., 121 F. Supp.
941 (D. Mass. 1954).
161 Towle v. Ross, 32 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ore. 1940).
162 Davilla v. Brunswick-Balke Collender Co., 94 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 304
U.S. 572 (1938).
163 U.S. HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONo., 1ST SESS., op. cit. supra note 140,
at 181, Comment by Mr. Sargoy.
164 U.S. HousE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., op. cit. supra note
140 at 176, Comment by Mr. Sargoy.
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against theater operators in the early 1930's. Half of the theaters were abusing
their exhibition licenses by holding pictures over for a day or peddling the picture
to other theaters.
Such practices had existed practically from nickelodeon days. ***
We taught the entire industry and made it copyright conscious as to the
very existence of this $250 minimum damage provision. I know of only two
cases, out of thousands, where we collected the $250. We were not inter-
ested in doing that . . .we wanted to deter . .. and keep the potential
thousands upon thousands of infringing uses out of courts.
The result of that educational process ... was that in the 1940's we
couldn't even find a newsreel that played out of turn in any theater in the
United States.
A publicity campaign based on suits filed and on infringements found might
go far in activating the institutional conscience and would tend to promote enough
public interest to make the U. S. attorneys more aware of the criminal sanctions
inposable on willful copyright infringers for profit.
Another example, besides the one posed by Mr. Sargoy, that the institutional
conscience may be made to act in this area is found in the conduct of University
Microfilms, Inc., a subsidiary of Xerox Corp., which makes copies of books and
other publications monthly, "[O]nly with permission of the copyright holders and
pays the holders 10% 'royalty' fees." '65 This corporation, in striving to increase
its profit, has seen fit to make this payment to copyright holders and obtain per-
mission from the holders before copying. It is submitted that other corporations
which copy for resale and those institutions that copy for internal commercial use
or libraries that copy for requesters, who use internally for commercial purposes,
must be made aware of their violations of the law in this copyright area. Once
made aware of the law and the possibility of prosecution, it is hoped that most
would follow the course set by University Microfilms, Inc.
V. Conclusion
Photocopiers of books and magazines, many of whom are violating federal
law, are hurting publishers' sales. The copyright statute grants absolute rights
protecting writings that are published in accordance with the requirements of
the federal copyright statute. The courts have put a gloss on the exclusive rights
granted by the statute by allowing copying in some instances under the doctrine
of "fair use."
It is submitted that a hand copy of a passage for private scholarly use is a "fair
use." As a slight extension, the mechanical reproduction of a single copy of a reason-
able portion for private scholarly use would also be a "fair use" and not an infringe-
ment of the federal act.
A hand copy for private commercial use is the borderline case, but if ever pre-
sented for decision, this use would probably be classified as a "fair use." A single
photocopy for a private commercial purpose might well be an infringement, unless
the copy be of hand copy length. Multiple copying for limited circulation or for
gratuitous or scholarly use is an infringement where there is the finding that the copies
may be a substitute for, and therefore in competition with, the copyrighted material.
Multiple copying for internal commercial use is more clearly an infringement because
of the substitution factor and the added notion that a prosperous user ought to pay
its own way. Some matter such as statutes and court decisions and ideas themselves
may be copied at will.
There are no judicial guidelines in the area of microfilming for storage and
preservation purposes, whether by a public library or a profit making organization.
The equities and needs of the times, and the parties, in a particular case would be
determinative.
In the computer area, it is concluded that there is no infringement when copy-
165 Wall Street Journal, June 13, 1963, p. 24, col. 3.
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righted material is fed into computer information systems. Whether this should be
a violation or will be under any revised statute is another question.
The problem confronting publishers is to stop substantially all the infringing
photocopying now going on in this country. Infringement holdings in isolated cases
are of little help by themselves. Armed with past decisions, presently instituted civil
suits, especially in the area of internal commercial use, and criminal prosecutions if
necessary, publishers should strive to inform copiers and the public that the bulk of
the photocopying in the country today is an infringement. By undertaking this educa-
tional campaign, there is evidence that institutions would police their own photo-
copying operations. Publishers have remained silent far too long. It is submitted that
most infringers do not know they are violating federal law. The users are not going
to go to the trouble of finding what the law is, if it is clear that no one is interested
enough to enforce the law against them. The publishers must forcefully demonstrate
their interest in the rights granted by the federal act and their readiness to protect
those rights.
David C. Petre
